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Can corrections spread misinformation to
new audiences? Testing for the elusive
familiarity backfire effect
Ullrich K. H. Ecker1* , Stephan Lewandowsky1,2 and Matthew Chadwick1
Abstract
Misinformation often continues to influence inferential reasoning after clear and credible corrections are provided;
this effect is known as the continued influence effect. It has been theorized that this effect is partly driven by
misinformation familiarity. Some researchers have even argued that a correction should avoid repeating the
misinformation, as the correction itself could serve to inadvertently enhance misinformation familiarity and may
thus backfire, ironically strengthening the very misconception that it aims to correct. While previous research has
found little evidence of such familiarity backfire effects, there remains one situation where they may yet arise: when
correcting entirely novel misinformation, where corrections could serve to spread misinformation to new audiences
who had never heard of it before. This article presents three experiments (total N = 1718) investigating the
possibility of familiarity backfire within the context of correcting novel misinformation claims and after a 1-week
study-test delay. While there was variation across experiments, overall there was substantial evidence against
familiarity backfire. Corrections that exposed participants to novel misinformation did not lead to stronger
misconceptions compared to a control group never exposed to the false claims or corrections. This suggests that it
is safe to repeat misinformation when correcting it, even when the audience might be unfamiliar with the
misinformation.
Keywords: Continued influence effect, Fact-checking, Myth debunking, Familiarity backfire effect, Illusory truth
effect, Mere exposure effect
Significance statement
Misinformation often continues to influence people’s
thinking and decision-making even after they have re-
ceived clear, credible corrections; this is known as the
continued influence effect. It has been suggested that
this effect is partly driven by the familiarity of false
claims, such that people are particularly influenced by
false claims that seem especially familiar (“I have heard
that before, so there must be something to it!”). Some
researchers have even recommended that a correction
should avoid repeating the misinformation, out of
concerns that the correction itself could inadvertently
enhance the familiarity of the false claim. This could
lead to corrections backfiring, ironically strengthening
the very misconceptions that they aim to correct. While
previous research has found little evidence of such famil-
iarity backfire effects, there remains one situation where
they may yet arise: when correcting entirely novel misin-
formation. Such corrections might familiarize people
with false claims that they had never encountered before,
and, therefore, such corrections could serve to spread
misinformation to new audiences. This article presents
three online experiments (total N = 1718 participants)
investigating the possibility of familiarity backfire within
the context of correcting novel misinformation claims.
While there was some variation across experiments,
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overall there was substantial evidence against familiarity
backfire: Corrections that exposed participants to novel
misinformation did not lead to stronger misconceptions
compared to a control group never exposed to the false
claims or corrections. This suggests that it is safe to re-
peat misinformation when correcting it, even when the
audience might be unfamiliar with the misinformation.
The advent of the Internet and the subsequent rise of
social media as a primary form of communication has
facilitated the distribution of misinformation at unprece-
dented levels (Southwell & Thorson, 2015; Vargo, Guo,
& Amazeen, 2018). Misinformation can have detrimental
effects at a societal and individual level, as ill-informed
decisions can have negative economic, social, and
health-related consequences (Bode & Vraga, 2018; Lazer
et al., 2018; Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017; Mac-
Farlane, Hurlstone, & Ecker, 2020; Southwell & Thorson,
2015). This is concerning because there is a significant
disparity between the ease of disseminating misinforma-
tion and the difficulty of correcting it. Corrections can
be ineffective, and individuals often continue to use cor-
rected misinformation in their inferential reasoning, a
phenomenon termed the continued influence effect
(Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017;
Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert,
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Paynter et al., 2019; Rich &
Zaragoza, 2016; Walter & Tukachinsky, 2020; Wilkes &
Leatherbarrow, 1988).
One theoretical account of the continued influence ef-
fect assumes that it results from selective retrieval (Ecker,
Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011; Ecker, Lewan-
dowsky, & Tang, 2010; Gordon, Quadflieg, Brooks, Ecker,
& Lewandowsky, 2019; Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky,
2017). More specifically, in line with dual-processing
models of memory (e.g., Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park,
2006; Yonelinas & Jacoby 2002; Zimmer & Ecker, 2010),
continued influence effects might arise when a reasoning
task features a retrieval cue that automatically activates
the misinformation, while recollection of the correction
fails (see Ayers & Reder, 1998; Marsh & Fazio, 2006). Ac-
cording to this account, automatic misinformation activa-
tion is driven by familiarity, an automatic process that
facilitates the rapid, context-free retrieval of previously en-
countered stimuli, whereby the degree of activation of a
memory representation depends upon the frequency with
which the associated stimulus has been encountered in
the past (Hintzman & Curran, 1994).
It follows that one driver of the continued influence
effect may lie in the fact that misinformation is typically
repeated within a correction, boosting its familiarity—for
example, clarifying that vaccines do not cause autism all
but requires repetition of the false vaccine-autism associ-
ation (e.g., see Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014;
Paynter et al., 2019). Apart from the fact that enhanced
familiarity will facilitate automatic misinformation re-
trieval, familiarity has also been found to foster per-
ceived truthfulness via metacognitive processes (Begg,
Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, &
Wänke, 2010; Parks & Toth, 2006)—either because en-
hanced familiarity indicates greater social consensus
(Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller, 2007; also see
Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991) or because familiar informa-
tion is processed more fluently and the perceived fluency
is misattributed to the information’s validity (Pennycook,
Cannon, & Rand, 2018; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, &
Yoon, 2007; Unkelbach, 2007). Thus, corrections that re-
peat the misinformation might inadvertently increase the
likelihood of it being retrieved and perceived as valid in
subsequent reasoning tasks (Schwarz et al., 2007; Swire
et al., 2017).
It has even been suggested that the boost in familiarity
associated with the repetition of misinformation within a
correction could be so detrimental that it could ironically
increase belief in the corrected misinformation (Schwarz
et al., 2007). This increase in post-correction belief in mis-
information, relative to either a pre-correction baseline in
the same sample of participants, or a no-misinformation-
exposure baseline in a separate sample, has been termed
the familiarity backfire effect (Cook & Lewandowsky,
2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). In order to avoid this ef-
fect, it is commonly suggested to educators, journalists,
and science communicators that corrections should avoid
repeating the targeted misinformation as much as possible
(Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012;
Peter & Koch, 2016; Schwarz, Newman, & Leach, 2016;
Schwarz et al., 2007).
However, despite familiarity backfire effects being prom-
inently discussed in the literature, empirical evidence of
such effects is scarce. In fact, the only clear demonstration
of a familiarity backfire effect was reported in an unpub-
lished manuscript by Skurnik, Yoon, and Schwarz (2007;
discussed by Schwarz et al., 2007), who presented partici-
pants with a flyer juxtaposing “myths vs. facts” associated
with the flu vaccine. It was found that after a 30-min
delay, a substantial proportion of myths were misremem-
bered as facts, and that attitudes towards the flu vaccine
became more negative compared to participants who had
not been presented with the flyer. In a similar study,
Skurnik, Yoon, Park, and Schwarz (2005) found that par-
ticipants were more likely to misremember myths as facts
after repeated vs. singular retractions. However, these ef-
fects were only found with a 3-day test delay and only in
older adults (not after shorter delays and in younger
adults, as in Skurnik et al., 2007), and the study also did
not feature a baseline condition against which to access
actual “backfire.”
By contrast, a number of contemporary studies have
failed to find evidence of familiarity backfire effects. For
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example, unlike Skurnik et al. (2005), Ecker et al. (2011)
found that multiple retractions were more effective than
singular retractions at reducing continued influence.
Cameron et al. (2013) compared the effectiveness of flu-
vaccine myth corrections that either avoided misinfor-
mation repetition (presenting facts only) or repeated
misinformation (including one condition featuring Skur-
nik et al.’s (2007) “myths vs. facts” flyer). Flu-vaccine
knowledge was measured prior to the manipulation and
again after a week, together with post-intervention belief
in the true and false claims. Cameron et al. found that
all conditions were successful at reducing misconcep-
tions, with the best outcomes in the “myths vs. facts”
condition, and the worst outcomes in the facts-only con-
dition that avoided myth repetition. Likewise, Ecker,
Hogan, and Lewandowsky (2017) found that repeating a
piece of misinformation when correcting it actually led
to stronger reduction of the continued influence effect
than a correction that avoided misinformation repeti-
tion. They argued that misinformation repetition fosters
co-activation of the misinformation and its correction,
which in turn facilitates conflict detection and informa-
tion integration when the correction is encoded, leading
to stronger knowledge revision (see Kendeou, Walsh,
Smith, & O’Brien, 2014). Finally, Swire et al. (2017) pre-
sented participants with a series of true and false claims
that were subsequently affirmed or corrected and mea-
sured the corresponding change in belief. They, too,
failed to observe any familiarity backfire effects: post-
correction belief in misinformation was always lower
than pre-correction belief. This reduction in false-claim
belief was observed even under conditions where the im-
pact of familiarity (relative to recollection) should be
maximal, viz. in elderly participants and after a long re-
tention interval of up to 3 weeks. Swire et al. concluded
that familiarity may contribute to continued influence
effects (i.e., ongoing reliance on corrected misinforma-
tion, especially after a delay, when recollection of the
correction fades but familiarity of the misinformation re-
mains relatively intact; see Knowlton & Squire, 1995),
but that misinformation familiarity is not typically asso-
ciated with backfire effects (i.e., ironic boosts to false-
claim beliefs relative to a pre-correction or no-exposure
baseline).
In a recent study, Ecker, O’Reilly, Reid, and Chang
(2020) found that presenting participants with only a
correction (a brief retraction or a more detailed refuta-
tion) of a real-world false claim, without prior exposure
to the false claim itself, decreased both false-claim-
congruent reasoning and belief in the false claim relative
to a control group who received no exposure to the
claim. This demonstrated that mere exposure to a false
claim within a correction did not cause a familiarity
backfire effect. However, Ecker et al. highlighted one
remaining situation where a familiarity backfire effect may
yet occur: when novel misinformation is introduced to a re-
cipient through a correction. If a person’s first encounter
with a false claim is provided by a correction, the correction
could inadvertently familiarize the person with the previ-
ously unfamiliar misinformation; corrections may thus po-
tentially spread the misinformation to new audiences (as
suggested by Schwarz et al., 2016). Indeed, the greatest
boost to a claim’s familiarity will be associated with the ini-
tial encounter, while additional encounters will bring about
exponentially decreasing familiarity boosts (consistent with
theoretical frameworks that propose novelty-dependent en-
coding; e.g., Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, &
Greaves, 2012).
It is easy to see how social media could facilitate situa-
tions where an individual is exposed to a correction
without previously having encountered the correspond-
ing misinformation. Such exposure may not only
familiarize the consumer with the novel misinformation,
but may also lend some credibility to the false claim, in
the sense that a correction may signal that someone ac-
tually believes the false claim to be true, thus warranting
a correction. This makes the possibility of a familiarity
backfire effect with novel misinformation a concerning
notion. Thus, the main purpose of the present study was
to investigate the possibility of a familiarity backfire ef-
fect within the context of correcting novel misinforma-
tion. To this end, the study aimed to replicate Ecker
et al. (2020), using claims that were maximally novel to
participants.
Except for the use of novel false claims, Experiment 1
was a straight replication of the brief-retraction condi-
tions of Ecker et al. (2020; Experiment 2). Experiments 2
and 3 aimed to replicate Experiment 1, while manipulat-
ing factors that should influence the relative impact of
familiarity, viz. retention interval (Experiment 2) and
cognitive load during encoding (Experiment 3).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 presented participants with true and false
claims and/or associated affirmative or corrective fact-
checks. An example claim was “The national animal of
Scotland is the unicorn” (see Fig. 1 and the “Method”
section for further details). The experiment used a 2 × 2
between-subjects design, fully crossing factors claim ex-
posure (yes/no) and fact-check exposure (yes/no).1 Con-
ditions were no-exposure control (NE), claim-only (CO),
fact-check-only (FCO), and claim-plus-fact-check (CFC;
in this condition, participants first received all claims
1Technically, the design was a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design with the within-
subjects factor claim veracity (true/false); however, as the prime inter-
est was on false claims, analyses were conducted separately for true
and false claims.
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without any indication of validity, and then received the
fact-checks separately). The experiment was designed to
encourage participants to rely on familiarity during re-
trieval in order to maximize the possibility of observing
familiarity-related backfire effects. Fact-checks in fact-
check-only and claim-plus-fact-check conditions there-
fore simply stated the claim with a brief affirmation or
correction (e.g., “The national animal of Scotland is the
unicorn” followed by the word “TRUE” and a green tick
mark; see Fig. 2) but did not provide supporting, detailed
information, since additional refutational information
has been shown to increase the likelihood that the cor-
rective message is later recollected (Chan et al., 2017;
Ecker et al., 2020; Paynter et al., 2019; Swire et al., 2017).
Additionally, a 1-week retention interval between expos-
ure and test was used, as the ability to engage in recol-
lection diminishes over time, while familiarity remains
relatively constant (Knowlton & Squire, 1995).
Belief in the claims at test was determined by direct
claim-belief ratings, as well as a series of inference ques-
tions that indirectly measured claim belief by assessing
claim-congruent reasoning. The inference questions
were presented first because the inference score was de-
termined a priori as the main dependent variable of
interest, following ample precedent (e.g., Ecker et al.,
2017). The inference score provides a belief measure that
is not “contaminated” by concurrent exposure to the
core claim, whereas it is impossible to measure direct
belief in a claim without at the same time exposing par-
ticipants to it. Thus, only the inference score provides a
“clean” baseline in the no-exposure condition. Moreover,
presenting the claims for a direct belief rating first would
have artificially increased claim familiarity across all con-
ditions, and acted as a potent retrieval cue for recollec-
tion of the fact-checks. The core hypothesis (H1FIS)
2 was
that we would observe a familiarity backfire effect; that
is, that mere exposure to corrective fact-checks would
lead to increased inference scores relative to the no-
exposure baseline (i.e., NE < FCO).
A series of secondary hypotheses was specified as fol-
lows (these are also summarized, together with the pri-
mary hypothesis, in Table 1 in the “Results” section):
Hypothesis H1FBR was that mere corrections would
also increase false-claim belief ratings relative to baseline
(i.e., NE < FCO). Hypothesis H1TIS/TBR was that mere af-
firmations would be effective and would thus increase
inference scores and true-claim belief ratings relative to
baseline (i.e., NE < FCO).
Hypothesis 2 investigated the illusory truth effect,
whereby mere exposure to information renders it more
likely to be evaluated as truthful (Dechêne et al., 2010).
It was specified that mere exposure to claims would in-
crease claim-congruent reasoning for both false claims
(H2FIS) and true claims (H2TIS), and boost belief in both
false (H2FBR) and true claims (H2TBR), relative to base-
line (i.e., NE < CO).
Hypothesis 3 tested the effectiveness of fact-checking a
claim that had already been encountered. It was speci-
fied that, relative to the claims-only condition, fact-
checks of previously presented claims would decrease
false-claim-congruent reasoning and false-claim belief
(i.e., CFC < CO; H3FIS and H3FBR), while increasing true-
claim-congruent reasoning and true-claim belief (i.e.,
CFC > CO; H3TIS and H3TBR).
Finally, Hypothesis 4 tested whether correcting previ-
ously presented false claims would reduce inference and
belief scores back to or even below baseline. This is
technically a test for continued influence, as previous re-
search has found that corrections are often not able to
eliminate misinformation influence down to baseline
levels. However, in most continued-influence studies,
the misinformation is initially presented as true and
valid, whereas the initial presentation of false claims in
the claim-plus-fact-check condition occurred without
validation (i.e., the false claim was presented initially
without being labeled a fact, which would have presum-
ably increased initial belief, making it harder to subse-
quently bring belief back down to baseline). It was,
therefore, not expected that inference scores would be
greater in the claim-plus-fact-check condition than the
no-exposure control. In fact, guided by the results of
Ecker et al. (2020), we expected that corrections of pre-
viously presented false claims would decrease false-
Fig. 1 Example of a true claim (left) and false claim (right)
2Subscripts FIS, FBR, TIS, TBR will be used to refer to false-claim in-
ference scores, false-claim belief ratings, true-claim inference scores,
and true-claim belief ratings, respectively.
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claim-congruent reasoning (H4FIS) and false-claim belief
(H4FBR) back to or even below the level of the no-
exposure control, and specified Hypothesis 4 as NE >
CFC.
Method
Participants
An a-priori power analysis using G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that a minimum sample
size of 352 was needed to detect a small effect of f = .15 be-
tween two groups with α = .05 and 1 − β = .80. In order to
account for attrition rates and ensure sufficient power, it
was decided to recruit 440 participants—however, due to
miscommunication, this sample size was used for the entire
experiment even though its calculation was based on only
two groups, and thus the experiment was somewhat
underpowered. Participants were US-based adult Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers, who had completed at
least 5000 so-called human-intelligence tasks (HITs) with
97% + approval. MTurk data are largely regarded as being
of comparative quality to data from convenience samples
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016;
Necka, Cacioppo, Norman, & Cacioppo, 2016).
A subset of 331 participants was randomly assigned to
one of the three exposure conditions (CO, FCO, or
CFC) of an experimental survey, with the constraint of
approximately equal cell sizes. The retention rate be-
tween study and test was approximately 80%, with 264
participants returning for the test phase. An additional
109 participants completed the NE control condition,
Fig. 2 Example of an affirmation (left) and correction (right)
Table 1 Contrasts run in Experiment 1
dV/hypothesis Effect tested F(1,367) P
False-claim inference scores
H1FIS: NE < FCO Familiarity backfire effect 5.31 .022
a
H2FIS: NE < CO Illusory truth effect 2.72 .100
H3FIS: CFC < CO Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 2.73 .099
H4FIS: NE > CFC Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 0.01 .941
False-claim belief ratings
H1FBR: NE < FCO Familiarity backfire effect < 0.01 .971
H2FBR: NE < CO Illusory truth effect 3.03 .082
H3FBR: CFC < CO Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 13.75 <.001
a
H4FBR: NE > CFC Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 4.78 .029
True-claim inference scores
H1TIS: NE < FCO Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 36.09 <.001
a
H2TIS: NE < CO Illusory truth effect 4.23 .041
a
H3TIS: CFC > CO Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 9.40 .002
a
True-claim belief ratings
H1TBR: NE < FCO Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 82.84 <.001
a
H2TBR: NE < CO Illusory truth effect 5.32 .022
a
H3TBR: CFC > CO Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 30.95 <.001
a
Note. Hypotheses are numbered H1–4 (primary hypothesis in bold; see text for details); subscripts FIS, TIS, FBR, and TBR refer to false-claim and true-claim
inference scores and belief ratings, respectively. Conditions are NE no-exposure; CO claim-only; FCO fact-check-only; CFC claim-plus-fact-check. aindicates statistical
significance (for secondary contrasts: after Holm-Bonferroni correction)
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which involved only a test phase and was, therefore, run
separately (and concurrently with the test phase of the
other conditions). Two participants were identified as er-
ratic responders based on an a-priori exclusion criterion
(see “Results” for details). The final sample size for ana-
lysis was thus N = 371 (condition NE n = 108; CO n = 81;
FCO n = 92; CFC n = 90; age range 20–71 years; Mage =
39.91; SDage = 11.99; 208 male, 160 female, and 3 partici-
pants of undisclosed gender). A post-hoc power analysis
confirmed an achieved power in regards to the observed
main effect of condition in the analysis of inference
scores (ηp
2 = .022; see “Results” below) of 1 − β = .67.
Participants were paid US$0.40 for the study phase and
US$0.60 for the test phase.
Materials
Claims A total of 12 claims (six true, six false) were se-
lected from an initial pool of 48, with the intention of
minimizing claim familiarity. To this end, prior to con-
ducting the present study, the 48 claims were evaluated by
a separate sample of N = 91 participants via an MTurk
survey (see “Appendix” for details). The familiarity and be-
lievability of each claim were rated on Likert scales ran-
ging from 1 (low familiarity/believability) to 5 (high
familiarity/believability). Claims with familiarity ratings >
2 were excluded, as were excessively believable or un-
believable claims (believability ratings < 2 or > 4), resulting
in a pool of 22 candidate claims. From this pool, the least
familiar claims were then selected while taking into ac-
count additional factors such as comprehensibility and the
quality of corresponding inferential-reasoning questions
that could be generated. All claims are provided in the
“Appendix.” The average familiarity of selected false
claims was M = 1.67, with mean believability of M = 2.89;
average familiarity of selected true claims was M = 1.63,
with mean believability of M = 2.54.
Claims were presented in a format that mimicked a social-
media post (see Fig. 1). Each claim was associated with a dif-
ferent fictional account, and was displayed underneath the
account name. A circular image with the first letter of the ac-
count handle was displayed instead of a traditional profile
picture, similar to the default icon for a Google account.
Fact-checks There were 12 fact-checks matched to the
12 claims; these were displayed in the same social-media
format as the original claim (see Fig. 2). Each fact-check
repeated the corresponding claim along with an affirm-
ation (a “TRUE” tag and a green tick) if the claim was
true, or a correction (a “FALSE” tag and a red cross) if it
was false. All fact-checks were associated with the fic-
tional account “Facts First,” which was introduced as an
independent and objective fact-checking group that veri-
fies claims on social media.
Measures Claim-related inferential reasoning was mea-
sured through a series of 24 inference questions de-
signed to indirectly assess claim beliefs. There were two
such questions per claim, one of which was reverse-coded.
Each item presented the participants with a statement that
was related to a claim, but did not repeat the claim itself.
Statements were designed such that agreeing or disagreeing
with them would require reasoning that is congruent or in-
congruent with belief in the original claim. An example item
was “Facebook is investing money into promoting inoffensive
language on its platform.” Participants were asked to rate
their level of agreement with each statement on a Likert scale
ranging from 0 (complete disagreement) to 10 (complete
agreement). Inference questions are provided in the “Appen-
dix.” Claim belief was additionally measured through 12 dir-
ect belief ratings. Participants were asked to indicate how
much they believed each claim to be true or false on a Likert
scale ranging from 0 (certainly false) to 10 (certainly true).
Procedure
The experiment was administered using Qualtrics survey
software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) via the CloudResearch
platform (formerly TurkPrime; Litman, Robinson, &
Abberbock, 2017). After being presented with an ethically
approved information sheet, participants answered demo-
graphic questions regarding their English language profi-
ciency, gender, age, and country of residence. In the study
phase, depending on experimental condition, participants
read either a series of claims (claim-only condition CO), a
series of fact-checks (fact-check only, FCO), or a series of
claims followed by a series of associated fact-checks
(claim-plus-fact-check, CFC). All claims and/or fact-
checks were presented individually for at least 3 s. After a
1-week retention interval, participants who completed the
study phase were invited by email to participate in the test
phase. Participants in the no-exposure condition (NE)
only completed the test phase. In the test phase, partici-
pants were first presented with the 24 inference questions.
Inference questions were grouped by claim (i.e., paired
questions were always presented together), but otherwise
the sequence was randomized. Participants then answered
the 12 direct belief questions in a random order. Finally,
participants were asked if they had put in a reasonable ef-
fort and whether their data should be used for analysis
(with response options “Yes, I put in reasonable effort”;
“Maybe, I was a little distracted”; or “No, I really wasn’t
paying any attention”), before being debriefed.
Results
Data from all experiments are available at https://osf.io/6
9bq3/. Before analysis, we applied a set of a-priori exclusion
criteria. Three criteria were not met by any participants,
namely English proficiency self-rated as “poor”, uniform
responding (identified by a mean SD < 0.5 across all
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responses), and self-reported lack of effort (“no” response
to the effort question). To identify erratic responding, we
applied the following procedure: After inverting all reverse-
keyed items such that greater inference scores reflected
stronger claim-congruent reasoning, for each claim we cal-
culated the mean absolute difference between the two
inference-question responses (IQ1 and IQ2) and the belief
rating (BR) as (|IQ1 – IQ2| + |IQ1 – BR| + |IQ2 – BR|)/3.
The mean absolute differences across all 12 claims were
then averaged to produce a final score, where entirely con-
sistent responding would result in values approaching zero.
This score was then used to identify and reject erratic re-
sponders, using the inter-quartile outlier rule with a 2.2
multiplier (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987). As mentioned earlier,
we excluded n = 2 erratic responders based on this
procedure.
Mean false-claim and true-claim inference scores were
calculated by averaging the scores associated with the 12
false-claim and 12 true-claim inference questions, re-
spectively. Inference scores ranged from 0 to 10. The be-
lief ratings associated with the six false claims were
averaged to create a false-claim belief rating, and the rat-
ings associated with the six true claims were averaged to
create a true-claim belief rating. The scale was 0–10.
False claims
False-claim inference scores Mean false-claim infer-
ence scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 3. A
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a small
but significant main effect of condition, F(3,367) = 2.73,
ηp
2= .022, p = .044. To test the primary hypothesis that
corrections of novel myths would produce a familiarity
backfire effect, a planned contrast compared no-
exposure (NE M = 5.06, SE = 0.10) and fact-check-only
conditions (FCO M = 5.40, SE = 0.11). This contrast was
significant, F(1,367) = 5.31, ηp
2 = .014, p = .022. Thus, a
small familiarity backfire effect was observed, and H1FIS
was supported.
Next, three secondary planned contrasts were con-
ducted on false-claim inference scores, applying the
Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979). The results
of these contrasts are reported in the first panel of Table
1 (together with the primary contrast). In order to test
for an illusory truth effect, we compared the claim-only
(CO M = 5.31, SE = 0.12) and no-exposure conditions.
The difference was non-significant, and H2FIS was
rejected accordingly.
The effectiveness of correcting a previously encoun-
tered false claim was investigated by contrasting the
claim-plus-fact-check (CFC M = 5.04, SE = 0.11) and
claim-only conditions. The difference was non-
significant, and so H3FIS was rejected.
In order to test whether correcting previously pre-
sented false claims would reduce inference scores below
baseline, the no-exposure condition was contrasted with
the claim-plus-fact-check condition. The difference was
clearly non-significant, so H4FIS was also rejected.
False-claim belief ratings Mean false-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 4. A one-way
ANOVA found a significant main effect of condition,
F(3,367) = 4.65, ηp
2 = .037, p = .003. A series of four
Fig. 3 Mean false-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure), CO (claim-only), FCO (fact-check-only), and CFC (claim-plus-fact-
check) in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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planned contrasts was then conducted, the results of
which are reported in the second panel of Table 1.
In order to test for a familiarity backfire effect in belief
ratings, the no-exposure condition (NE M = 4.38, SE =
0.16) was contrasted with the fact-check-only condition
(FCO: M = 4.39, SE = 0.17). The difference was non-
significant, and thus no additional evidence for familiar-
ity backfire was obtained; H1FBR was rejected.
To test for an illusory truth effect, we compared no-
exposure to claim-only (CO M = 4.81, SE = 0.19) condi-
tions. Belief ratings were numerically higher in the
claim-only condition, but the difference was non-
significant; H2FBR was, therefore, rejected.
The effectiveness of corrections targeting a previously
encountered false claim was tested by contrasting the
claim-plus-fact-check (CFC M = 3.86, SE = 0.18) and
claim-only conditions. Belief ratings were significantly
lower in the claim-plus-fact-check condition, supporting
H3FBR.
True claims
True-claim inference scores Mean true-claim inference
scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 5. A one-way
ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition,
F(3,367) = 15.92, ηp
2 = .115, p < .001. Three planned con-
trasts tested for specific condition differences. Results
are reported in the third panel of Table 1.
To test if mere affirmations increased inference scores
relative to baseline, we compared no-exposure (NE M =
4.59, SE = 0.11) and fact-check-only (FCO M = 5.53, SE =
0.11) conditions. This was a highly significant difference,
so H1TIS was supported.
The illusory truth effect was tested for by contrasting
no-exposure and claim-only (COM = 4.92, SE = 0.12) con-
ditions. Inference scores were significantly greater in the
claim-only condition; H2TIS was, therefore, supported.
The effectiveness of fact-checks affirming previously en-
countered claims was examined by contrasting claim-
plus-fact-check (CFC M = 5.44, SE = 0.12) and claim-only
conditions. Inference scores were found to be significantly
greater in the claim-plus-fact-check condition, so H3TIS
was also supported.
To test the effectiveness of correcting a previously pre-
sented false claim relative to baseline, the claim-plus-
fact-check condition was compared to no-exposure con-
trol. Belief ratings were numerically lower in the claim-
plus-fact-check condition, but the contrast was non-
significant after correcting for multiple tests; H4FBR was
thus rejected.
True-claim belief ratings Mean true-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 6. A one-way
ANOVA returned a significant main effect of condition,
F(3,367) = 39.08, ηp
2 = .242, p < .001. Three planned con-
trasts were performed; results are presented in the
fourth panel of Table 1.
To test the effectiveness of a mere affirmation relative
to baseline, we compared the no-exposure condition
(NE M = 3.74, SE = 0.16) with the fact-check-only condi-
tion (FCO: M = 5.90, SE = 0.17). The difference was
found to be highly significant, supporting H1TBR.
Fig. 4 Mean false-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure), CO (claim-only), FCO (fact-check-only), and CFC (claim-plus-fact-check)
in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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To test for an illusory truth effect, we contrasted no-
exposure and claim-only (CO M = 4.31, SE = 0.19) condi-
tions. Belief ratings were significantly higher in the
claim-only condition, providing evidence for an illusory
truth effect and supporting H2TBR.
Finally, we contrasted the claim-plus-fact-check (CFC
M = 5.73, SE = 0.18) and claim-only conditions to test
whether an affirmation of a previously presented claim
enhanced belief. Belief was higher in the claim-plus-fact-
check condition, and so H3TBR was supported.
Discussion
Experiment 1 found evidence for a small familiarity
backfire effect on inference scores, supporting Skurnik
et al. (2005). After a 1-week study-test delay, participants
who were exposed only to the corrective fact-check
showed reasoning more in line with the false claim than
participants never exposed to either the claim or the
fact-check. This provides tentative evidence that correc-
tions can backfire and ironically increase misinformed
reasoning when they familiarize people with novel
Fig. 6 Mean true-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure), CO (claim-only), FCO (fact-check-only), and CFC (claim-plus-fact-check)
in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
Fig. 5 Mean true-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure), CO (claim-only), FCO (fact-check-only), and CFC (claim-plus-fact-
check) in Experiment 1. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
Ecker et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications            (2020) 5:41 Page 9 of 25
misinformation. However, no familiarity backfire effect
was observed on direct belief ratings, suggesting that ex-
posure to the previously corrected claim at test may
have facilitated recollection of the correction. Given the
small magnitude of the effect on inference scores, we
aimed to replicate the result in Experiment 2 before
drawing stronger conclusions; however, to foreshadow,
the effect did not replicate.
Furthermore, Experiment 1 provided some additional
evidence for illusory truth effects after just a single ex-
posure (Begg et al., 1992; Dechêne et al., 2010; Penny-
cook et al., 2018): participants’ claim-congruent
reasoning and beliefs were stronger for claims that they
were previously exposed to, at least when the claims
were actually true.
In general, it was found that fact-checks were effective
when they targeted a claim that participants had already
encountered before. Relative to the claim-only condition,
the claim-plus-fact-check condition reduced false-claim
beliefs and increased true-claim beliefs as well as true-
claim-congruent reasoning (the reduction in false-claim
inference scores was non-significant). These results rep-
licate Ecker et al.’s (2020) finding that fact-checks tended
to be more impactful if participants had previously been
exposed to the relevant claim. The overall pattern also
replicates Swire et al. (2017) in that affirmations tended
to be more impactful than corrections, presumably be-
cause familiarity and recollection operate in unison for
true claims (both driving acceptance) but stand in op-
position with false claims (where claim familiarity will
foster acceptance but correction recollection will drive
rejection). However, correcting previously presented
false claims did not reduce inference scores below the
no-exposure baseline (the effect for belief ratings was
marginal but non-significant). This contrasts to some ex-
tent with the findings of Ecker et al. (2020), although
that study did not contrast no-exposure and claim-plus-
fact-check conditions after a 1-week delay. The absence
of a stronger reduction is, therefore, again best explained
by the tension between familiarity and recollection pro-
cesses, with the latter more strongly compromised by
the substantial retention interval.
Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the familiarity
backfire effect found in Experiment 1. Additionally, Ex-
periment 2 manipulated retention interval, so the test
was either immediate (henceforth indicated by lower-
case i) or by 1 week as in Experiment 1 (indicated by
lower-case d). The rationale for this was that a familiar-
ity backfire effect should arise only with a delayed test,
not an immediate test, when recollection of the correc-
tion will still be strong enough to avoid ironic correction
effects. Experiment 2 therefore replicated exactly the
four experimental conditions of Experiment 1, but added
claim-only, fact-check-only, and claim-plus-fact-check
conditions with immediate test; it thus had a between-
subjects design with the sole factor of condition (NE;
COi; FCOi; CFCi; COd; FCOd; CFCd).
The design and analysis plan for Experiment 2 were
pre-registered (https://osf.io/69bq3/registrations). As in
Experiment 1, the core hypothesis regarded the familiar-
ity backfire effect; it was hypothesized that false-claim
inference scores would be higher in the delayed fact-
check-only condition relative to no-exposure control
(H1FISd; NE < FCOd). A related secondary hypothesis
was that in the immediate test, there should be no back-
fire and indeed a corrective effect (H1FISi; NE > FCOi).
Supplementary hypotheses included the supplementary
hypotheses of Experiment 1 (we refrain from repeating
these here, but they are specified again in Table 2); add-
itional supplementary hypotheses were formulated regard-
ing the effects of the delay manipulation on scores in the
fact-check-only (H5) and claim-plus-fact-check (H6) con-
ditions. It was assumed that significant forgetting would
occur over time, implying that false-claim inference scores
and belief ratings would be lower in the immediate fact-
check-only (FCOi) and claim-plus-fact-check (CFCi) con-
ditions than the respective delayed conditions (H5FIS and
H5FBR; see Table 2), and that true-claim inference scores
and belief ratings would be higher in the immediate fact-
check-only (FCOi) and claim-plus-fact-check (CFCi) con-
ditions than the respective delayed conditions (H5TIS and
H5TBR; see Table 2).
Method
Participants
A power analysis indicated that to detect an effect of the
size observed in Experiment 1 (main effect of condition
on false-claim inference scores, ηp
2 = .022) with α = 0.05
and 1 − β = 0.80 across the four replicated conditions
would require a minimum sample size of n = 123 per
condition. In Experiment 1, the lowest retention of any
of the conditions was 81/110 = 73.63% (condition CO). It
was thus decided to recruit n = 170 participants per con-
dition in the delayed-test conditions and n = 130 partici-
pants in the immediate-test conditions and the no-
exposure condition, in the hope of achieving a test-
phase sample size of n ≈ 130 per condition (i.e., total
N = 3 × 170 + 4 × 130 = 1030). Participants were US-
based adult MTurk workers who had completed at least
5000 HITs with 97% + approval. Participants who had
completed Experiment 1 were excluded from participa-
tion. The delayed-test conditions, the immediate-test
conditions, and the no-exposure condition were again
run separately due to differences in instructions and re-
imbursements, with random condition assignment in the
delayed and immediate surveys. The immediate-test and
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Table 2 Contrasts run in Experiment 2
dV/hypothesis Effect tested F(1,932) P
False-claim inference scores
H1FISi: NE > FCOi Effect of correction vs. baseline 70.33 < .001
a
H2FISi: NE < COi Illusory truth effect 1.63 .202
H3FISi: CFCi < COi Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 114.14 < .001
a
H4FISi: NE > CFCi Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 88.08 < .001
a
H1FISd: NE < FCOd Familiarity backfire effect 0.02 .895
H2FISd: NE < COd Illusory truth effect 9.89 .002
a
H3FISd: CFCd < COd Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 11.64 < .001
a
H4FISd: NE > CFCd Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 0.04 .850
H5FIS: FCOi < FCOd Delay effect on correction 72.21 < .001
a
H6FIS: CFCi < CFCd Delay effect on claim+correction 88.43 < .001
a
False-claim belief ratings
H1FBRi: NE > FCOi Effect of correction vs. baseline 83.13 < .001
a
H2FBRi: NE < COi Illusory truth effect 3.75 .053
b
H3FBRi: CFCi < COi Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 87.36 < .001
a
H4FBRi: NE > CFCi Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 126.87 < .001
a
H1FBRd: NE < FCOd Familiarity backfire effect 2.02 .155
H2FBRd: NE < COd Illusory truth effect 14.09 < .001
a
H3FBRd: CFCd < COd Effect of claim+correction vs. claim-only 37.91 < .001
a
H4FBRd: NE > CFCd Effect of claim+correction vs. baseline 5.12 .024
H5FBR: FCOi < FCOd Delay effect on correction 63.33 < .001
a
H6FBR: CFCi < CFCd Delay effect on claim+correction 85.50 < .001
a
True-claim inference scores
H1TISi: NE < FCOi Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 148.92 < .001
a
H2TISi: NE < COi Illusory truth effect 2.21 .137
H3TISi: CFCi > COi Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 121.24 < .001
a
H1TISd: NE < FCOd Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 18.24 < .001
a
H2TISd: NE < COd Illusory truth effect 0.19 .666
H3TISd: CFCd > COd Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 15.07 < .001
a
H5TIS: FCOi > FCOd Delay effect on affirmation 23.51 < .001
a
H6TIS: CFCi > CFCd Delay effect on claim+affirmation 72.57 < .001
a
True-claim belief ratings
H1TBRi: NE < FCOi Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 45.71 < .001
a
H2TBRi: NE < COi Illusory truth effect 3.79 .052
b
H3TBRi: CFCi > COi Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 108.75 < .001
a
H1TBRd: NE < FCOd Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 57.16 < .001
a
H2TBRd: NE < COd Illusory truth effect 6.49 .011
a
H3TBRd: CFCD > COd Effect of claim+affirmation vs. claim-only 25.31 < .001
a
H5TBR: FCOi > FCOd Delay effect on affirmation 0.38 .536
H6TBR: CFCi > CFCd Delay effect on claim+affirmation 1.37 .243
Note. Hypotheses are numbered H1–6 (primary hypothesis in bold; see text for details); subscripts FISi/d, TISi/d, FBRi/d, and TISi/d refer to false-claim and true-
claim inference scores and belief ratings in immediate and delayed tests, respectively. Conditions are NE no-exposure; COi/d claim-only with immediate/delayed
test; FCOi/d fact-check-only with immediate/delayed test; CFCi/d claim-plus-fact-check with immediate/delayed test. aindicates statistical significance after Holm-
Bonferroni correction. bindicates an effect in the opposite of hypothesized direction
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no-exposure conditions were run concurrently with the
delayed test; participants were not able to complete
more than one condition.
A subset of 509 participants was randomly assigned to
one of the three delayed-test conditions, with the con-
straint of approximately equal cell sizes. The retention
rate between study and test was approximately 84%, with
427 participants returning for the test phase. An add-
itional 521 participants completed the immediate-test
and NE conditions. Nine participants were excluded
based on a-priori criteria (see the “Results” section for
details). The final sample size for analysis was thus N =
939 (condition NE n = 128; COi n = 129; FCOi n = 129;
CFCi n = 129; COd n = 140; FCOd n = 144; CFCd n =
140; age range 20–81 years; Mage = 41.35; SDage = 11.97;
469 male, 467 female, and 3 participants of undisclosed
gender). Participants were paid US$0.40 for the study
phase and US$0.60 for the test phase.
Materials
Claims, measures, and procedure were identical to Ex-
periment 1, except that Experiment 2 also contained an
immediate test, where participants just completed a 1-
min word puzzle between study and test.
Results
Before analysis, we applied a set of a-priori (pre-regis-
tered) exclusion criteria. Two criteria were not met by
any participants, including English proficiency self-rated
as “poor,” and self-reported lack of effort. Uniform
responding and erratic responding were identified as in
Experiment 1, which led to the exclusion of n = 5 and
n = 4 participants, respectively. Inference and belief
scores were calculated as in Experiment 1.
False claims
False-claim inference scores Mean false-claim infer-
ence scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 7. A
one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
condition, F(6,932) = 48.66, ηp
2 = .239, p < .001. To test
the primary hypothesis that corrections of novel myths
would produce a familiarity backfire effect, a planned
contrast compared no-exposure (NE M = 5.01, SE = 0.11)
and delayed fact-check-only (FCOd M = 4.99, SE = 0.11)
conditions. This was clearly non-significant, F(1,932) =
0.02, ηp
2 < .001, p = .895. Thus, no familiarity backfire ef-
fect was observed, and H1FISd was not supported. How-
ever, the inference score in the immediate fact-check-
only condition (FCOi M = 3.65, SE = 0.11) was signifi-
cantly lower than the no-exposure control, supporting
secondary hypothesis H1FISi.
Next, the supplementary planned contrasts were con-
ducted on false-claim inference scores. Results are re-
ported in the first panel of Table 2 (together with the
primary contrast). To summarize, we found evidence of
an illusory truth effect in the delayed (COd M = 5.51,
SE = 0.11) but not the immediate test (COi M = 5.22,
SE = 0.11), rejecting H2FISi and supporting H2FISd. Cor-
rections of previously presented false claims (CFCi M =
3.49, SE = 0.11; CFCd M = 4.98, SE = 0.11) were found ef-
fective relative to the claim-only condition at both delays
(supporting H3FISi and H3FISd). However, compared
against the no-exposure baseline, corrections of
Fig. 7 Mean false-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure), COi/d (claim-only, immediate/delayed test), FCOi/d (fact-check-only,
immediate/delayed test), and CFCi/d (claim-plus-fact-check, immediate/delayed test) in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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previously presented false claims were effective immedi-
ately but not after a delay (supporting H4FISi and reject-
ing H4FISd). As expected, the delay had a significant
impact on correction effectiveness in both fact-check-
only and claim-plus-fact-check conditions (supporting
H5FIS and H6FIS).
False-claim belief ratings Mean false-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 8. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition,
F(6,932) = 56.14, ηp
2 = .265, p < .001. Planned contrasts
were run to test specific hypotheses; results are provided
in the second panel of Table 2.
There was no evidence of familiarity backfire in belief
ratings, as the delayed fact-check-only condition (FCOd
M = 3.99, SE = 0.14) did not differ significantly from no-
exposure control (NE M = 4.29, SE = 0.15); H1FBRd was
thus rejected. However, a mere correction was effective
in the immediate test (FCOi M = 2.37, SE = 0.15), sup-
porting H1FBRi. There was mixed evidence regarding il-
lusory truth effects, with no-exposure differing
significantly from the claim-only condition in the de-
layed test (COd M = 5.06, SE = 0.14) but not the immedi-
ate test (COi M = 3.88, SE = 0.15), supporting H2FBRd but
rejecting H2FBRi. Corrections of previously presented
false claims (CFCi M = 1.92, SE = 0.15; CFCd M = 3.82,
SE = 0.14) were found effective relative to the claim-only
condition at both delays (supporting H3FBRi and H3FBRd).
However, mirroring the inference-score results, com-
pared against the no-exposure baseline, corrections of
previously presented false claims were effective immedi-
ately but not after a delay (supporting H4FBRi and
rejecting H4FBRd). Delay again had a significant impact
on correction effectiveness in both fact-check-only and
claim-plus-fact-check conditions (supporting H5FBR and
H6FBR).
True claims
True-claim inference scores Mean true-claim inference
scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 9. A one-way
ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of condition,
F(6,932) = 56.62, ηp
2 = .267, p < .001. Planned contrasts
tested for specific condition differences; results are re-
ported in the third panel of Table 2.
It was found that a mere affirmation increased infer-
ence scores relative to the no-exposure baseline (NE
M = 4.77, SE = 0.12) in both immediate (FCOi M = 6.87,
SE = 0.12) and delayed (FCOd M = 5.48, SE = 0.12) tests,
supporting H1TISi and H1TISd. There was no evidence
for illusory truth effects, with no significant difference
between claim-only and no-exposure conditions in ei-
ther the immediate (COi M = 5.02, SE = 0.12) or delayed
(COd M = 4.84, SE = 0.12) test; H2TISi and H2TISd were
thus rejected. Affirmations of previously presented true
claims (CFCi M = 6.92, SE = 0.12; CFCd M = 5.48, SE =
0.12) were found effective relative to the claim-only con-
dition at both delays (supporting H3TISi and H3TISd).
Again, delay had a significant impact on affirmation ef-
fectiveness in both fact-check-only and claim-plus-fact-
check conditions (supporting H5TIS and H6TIS).
True-claim belief ratings Mean true-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 10. A one-way
Fig. 8 Mean false-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure), COi/d (claim-only, immediate/delayed test), FCOi/d (fact-check-only,
immediate/delayed test), and CFCi/d (claim-plus-fact-check, immediate/delayed test) in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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ANOVA returned a significant main effect of condition,
F(6,932) = 34.98, ηp
2 = .184, p < .001. Planned contrasts
tested for specific condition differences; results are re-
ported in the fourth panel of Table 2.
It was found that a mere affirmation increased belief rat-
ings relative to the no-exposure baseline (NE M = 3.77,
SE = 0.19) in both immediate (FCOi M = 5.56, SE = 0.19)
and delayed (FCOd M = 5.71, SE = 0.18) tests, supporting
H1TBRi and H1TBRd. There was mixed evidence for illusory
truth effects, with a significant difference between claim-
only and no-exposure conditions in the delayed (COd
M = 4.43, SE = 0.18) but not the immediate (COi M = 3.26,
SE = 0.19) test, supporting H2TBRd and rejecting H2TBRi.
Affirmations of previously presented true claims (CFCi
M = 6.00, SE = 0.19; CFCd M = 5.70, SE = 0.18) were found
effective relative to the claim-only condition at both delays
(supporting H3TBRi and H3TBRd). In contrast to the infer-
ence scores, delay had no significant impact on affirmation
effectiveness in fact-check-only and claim-plus-fact-check
conditions (rejecting H5TBR and H6TBR).
Fig. 9 Mean true-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure), COi/d (claim-only, immediate/delayed test), FCOi/d (fact-check-only,
immediate/delayed test), and CFCi/d (claim-plus-fact-check, immediate/delayed test) in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
Fig. 10 Mean true-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure), COi/d (claim-only, immediate/delayed test), FCOi/d (fact-check-only,
immediate/delayed test), and CFCi/d (claim-plus-fact-check, immediate/delayed test) in Experiment 2. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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Discussion
The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the
familiarity backfire effect observed in Experiment 1. The
effect did not replicate; there was no evidence for famil-
iarity backfire in either the false-claim inference scores
or the false-claim belief scores. This is consonant with
the results that Ecker et al. (2020) obtained with non-
novel claims, and suggests that the familiarity boost
effected by exposure to a false claim within a correction
may be sufficient to offset the corrective effect of a mere
fact-check after a 1-week delay (thus resulting in the ob-
served null effect), but not sufficient to cause ironic
misconception-strengthening effects.
Evidence for illusory truth effects was again mixed:
false-claim inference scores and belief ratings, as well as
true-claim belief ratings, were greater in the claim-only
condition compared to the no-exposure baseline in a de-
layed test. This stands in contrast to Experiment 1,
where illusory truth effects were found only for true
claims. Given that participants were unable to reliably
differentiate between true and false claims prior to fact-
checks being provided, we suspect that the best explan-
ation for the overall pattern is that illusory truth effects
after a single exposure are small, and whether or not a
statistically significant effect is obtained is partially down
to random variation. There were no significant illusory
truth effects in the immediate test, suggesting that illu-
sory truth effects may be delay-dependent and thus
occur only if memory is relatively more reliant on
familiarity.
As in Experiment 1, fact-checks were generally effect-
ive when they targeted a claim that participants had
already encountered before. Relative to the claim-only
condition, the claim-plus-fact-check condition reduced
false-claim beliefs and false-claim-congruent reasoning
and increased true-claim beliefs and true-claim-
congruent reasoning across both retention intervals.
This again replicates the findings of Ecker et al. (2020)
that fact-checks are more impactful if participants had
previously been exposed to the relevant claim. However,
replicating Experiment 1, correcting previously pre-
sented false claims did not reduce inference scores or
belief ratings below the no-exposure baseline after a
delay. This is again best explained by the fact that famil-
iarity and recollection processes stand in opposition
when it comes to delayed appraisals of corrected false
claims. Additional support for this theoretical notion
comes from the pattern of delay effects observed: while
both fact-check-only and claim-plus-fact-check correc-
tions were much less effective at reducing false-claim be-
lief and false-claim-congruent reasoning after a longer
delay, with true-claim affirmations there were only delay
effects on inference scores. No delay effect was observed
for true-claim belief ratings, meaning that the effect of
affirmations did not wear off significantly over the
course of a week. This mirrors the findings of Swire
et al. (2017), who proposed the notion that correction
effects are less sustained than affirmation effects due to
the influence of claim familiarity. The post-affirmation
reduction in true-claim inference scores after a delay is
presumably due to the fact that the inference questions
did not contain strong retrieval cues.
Given that Experiments 1 and 2 yielded contradictory
evidence regarding the presence of familiarity backfire
effects, we conducted Experiment 3. Experiment 3 was a
replication of the no-exposure and delayed fact-check-
only conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, with an add-
itional manipulation of cognitive load during encoding.
The rationale for this manipulation was that familiarity
backfire effects should be more likely under cognitive-
load conditions.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted with the aim of replicating
the familiarity backfire effect observed in Experiment 1
but clearly absent in Experiment 2. It implemented only
the two conditions of main interest, viz. the no-exposure
and delayed fact-check-only conditions. Additionally,
cognitive load was manipulated (low vs. high, henceforth
indicated as l- and l+). Cognitive load is induced by the
division of attention between two demanding tasks; it is
known to impair memory (e.g., Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996), and, in particular, more
strategic memory processes rather than more automatic
processes such as familiarity (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 2000).
Cognitive load may also specifically impair the process-
ing of corrections (Ecker et al., 2010) such that the pri-
mary effect of a correction may be to boost the
familiarity of the retracted claim.
The design and the analysis plan for Experiment 3
were pre-registered (https://osf.io/69bq3/registrations).
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the core hypothesis per-
tained to the familiarity backfire effect; it was hypothe-
sized that false-claim inference scores would be higher
in the delayed fact-check-only condition under high load
than no-exposure control (H1FISl+; NE < FCOl+). We
also hypothesized that familiarity backfire would occur
without load (H1FISl-; NE < FCOl-), as in Experiment 1,
even though based on Experiment 2 we did not expect
to support this hypothesis.
Supplementary hypotheses included some of the sup-
plementary hypotheses of Experiments 1 and 2; these
are not repeated here but specified again in Table 3.
Additional supplementary hypotheses were formulated
regarding the effects of the cognitive-load manipulation
on scores in the fact-check-only conditions. It was as-
sumed that load would reduce correction effects. We
therefore expected that false-claim inference scores and
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belief ratings would be greater in the load condition than
the no-load condition (i.e., FCOl+ > FCOl-; H7FIS and
H7FBR, respectively; see Table 3), while true-claim infer-
ence scores and belief ratings would be greater in the
no-load condition than the load condition (FCOl+
< FCOl-; H7TIS and H7TBR, respectively; see Table 3).
Method
Participants
Participants were US-based adult MTurk workers who had
completed at least 5000 HITs with 97%+ approval. Partici-
pants who had completed Experiment 1 or 2 were excluded
from participation. The (two-phase) fact-check-only condi-
tions were again run separately from the no-exposure condi-
tion, with random load-condition assignment within the fact-
check-only conditions. The no-exposure condition was run
concurrently with the delayed fact-check-only test; participants
were not able to complete more than one condition.
Sampling decisions were guided by the power analysis
presented in Experiment 2. A total of 400 participants
were randomly assigned to one of the two fact-check-
only conditions, with the constraint of approximately
equal cell sizes. Failure to complete the secondary task
above chance level led to the exclusion of n = 17 partici-
pants from the test phase. The retention rate between
study and test was approximately 68%, with 260 partici-
pants returning for the test phase. An additional 151
participants completed the no-exposure condition.
Three participants were excluded based on a-priori
criteria (see the “Results” section for details). The final
sample size for analysis was thus N = 408 (condition NE
n = 150; FCOl- n = 128; FCOl+ n = 130; age range 20–74
years; Mage = 40.86; SDage = 12.10; 180 male, 227 female,
and 1 participant of undisclosed gender). Participants
were paid US$0.40 for the study phase and US$0.60 for
the test phase.
Materials
Claims, measures, and procedure were identical to Ex-
periment 1, with the exception of the secondary task—a
dot-pattern-recognition task—used to manipulate cogni-
tive load (following de Neys & Schaeken, 2007). Partici-
pants were presented with a dot matrix preceding each
fact-check (2-s presentation time) and had to perform a
2AFC recognition test immediately after reading the
fact-check. The to-be-remembered pattern was complex
in the FCOl+ condition (seven dots in random locations,
with no more than two (three) dots in any vertical/hori-
zontal (diagonal) line; two to four dots overlap between
the two test alternatives) but trivial in the FCOl- condi-
tion (four dots in a vertical/horizontal line; four random
positions in test lure; see Fig. 11). Above-chance per-
formance was defined as at least 8 out of 12 correct (cu-
mulative probability when guessing p = .194).
Results
Before analysis, we applied the same pre-registered ex-
clusion criteria as in Experiments 1 and 2. The criterion
Table 3 Contrasts run in Experiment 3
dV/hypothesis Effect tested F(1,405) P
False-claim inference scores
H1FISl+: NE < FCOl+ Familiarity backfire effect 0.06 .810
H1FISl-: NE < FCOl- Familiarity backfire effect 8.45 .004
ab
H7FIS: FCOl- < FCOl+ Load effect on correction 6.65 .010
a
False-claim belief ratings
H1FBRl-: NE < FCOl- Familiarity backfire effect 6.40 .012
ab
H1FBRl+: NE < FCOl+ Familiarity backfire effect 3.39 .066
b
H7FBR: FCOl- < FCOl+ Load effect on correction 0.45 .501
True-claim inference scores
H1TISl-: NE < FCOl- Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 19.21 < .001
a
H1TISl+: NE < FCOl+ Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 15.69 < .001
a
H7TIS: FCOl- > FCOl+ Load effect on affirmation 0.18 .671
True-claim belief ratings
H1TBRl-: NE < FCOl- Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 40.61 < .001
a
H1TBRl+: NE < FCOl+ Effect of affirmation vs. baseline 22.32 < .001
a
H7TBR: FCOl- > FCOl+ Load effect on affirmation 2.60 .108
Note. Hypotheses are numbered H1 and H7 (primary hypotheses in bold; see text for details); subscripts FIS, TIS, FBR, and TBR refer to false-claim and true-claim
inference scores and belief ratings, respectively; no-load and load conditions are indicated by l- and l+. Conditions are NE no-exposure; FCOl± fact-check-only with
no load or with load. aindicates statistical significance (for secondary contrasts: after Holm-Bonferroni correction). bindicates effect in the opposite of
hypothesized direction
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of “poor” English proficiency was not met by any partici-
pant, but n = 1 participant was excluded due to self-
reported lack of effort. Uniform and erratic responding
each led to the exclusion of n = 1 participant. Inference and
belief scores were calculated as in Experiments 1 and 2.
False-claim inference scores Mean false-claim infer-
ence scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 12. A
one-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
condition, F(2,405) = 5.00, ηp
2 = .024, p = .007. To test
the primary hypothesis that corrections of novel myths
would produce a familiarity backfire effect, a planned
contrast compared the no-exposure condition (NE M =
5.11, SE = 0.09) with the fact-check-only condition with
load (FCOl+ M = 5.08, SE = 0.09). This was clearly non-
significant, F(1,405) = 0.06, ηp
2 < .001, p = .810. We also
contrasted the no-exposure condition with the fact-
check-only condition with no load (FCOl- M = 4.74, SE =
Fig. 11 Example study and test patterns in fact-check-only conditions with high load (FCOl+; top) and low load (FCOl-; bottom)
Fig. 12 Mean false-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure) and FCOl± (fact-check-only, with/without cognitive load) in
Experiment 3. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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0.09), which mirrors the test for familiarity backfire in
Experiments 1 and 2. This was significant, F(1,405) =
8.45, ηp
2 = .020, p = .004, but constituted a corrective ef-
fect (i.e., NE > FCOl-). Thus, no familiarity backfire effect
was observed, and H1FISl+ and H1FISl- were rejected. A
supplementary planned contrast found a significant ef-
fect of cognitive load, supporting H7FIS (see top panel of
Table 3).
False-claim belief ratings Mean false-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 13. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition,
F(2,405) = 3.49, ηp
2 = .017, p = .032. Planned contrasts
were run to test specific hypotheses; results are provided
in the second panel of Table 3.
It was found that a mere correction with no load at
encoding (FCOl- M = 4.02, SE = 0.14) reduced false-
claim belief relative to no-exposure control (NE M =
4.52, SE = 0.13); this rejects familiarity backfire hypoth-
esis H1FBRl-. The fact-check-only condition with load
(FCOl+ M = 4.16, SE = 0.14) did not differ significantly
from either of the two other conditions; this rejects
H1FBRl+ and H7FBR.
True-claim inference scores Mean true-claim inference
scores across conditions are shown in Fig. 14. A one-
way ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of con-
dition, F(2,405) = 11.99, ηp
2 = .056, p < .001. Planned con-
trasts tested for specific condition differences; results are
reported in the third panel of Table 3. It was found that
affirmations were equally effective across load conditions
(NE M = 4.79, SE = 0.10; FCOl- M = 5.41, SE = 0.10;
FCOl+ M = 5.35, SE = 0.10); this supports H1TISl- and
H1TISl+, and rejects H7TIS.
True-claim belief ratings Mean true-claim belief rat-
ings across conditions are shown in Fig. 15. A one-way
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of condition,
F(2,405) = 22.32, ηp
2 = .099, p < .001. Planned contrasts
tested for specific condition differences; results are re-
ported in the fourth panel of Table 3. A mere affirm-
ation increased true-claim belief equally in both load
conditions (NE M = 4.03, SE = 0.16; FCOl- M = 5.49, SE =
0.17; FCOl+ M = 5.11, SE = 0.17); this supports H1TBRl-
and H1TBRl+; it rejects H7TBR.
Discussion
Experiment 3 again found no evidence for familiarity
backfire effects in either inference scores or belief rat-
ings. In fact, the no-load condition of Experiment 3
found evidence that a mere correction of a novel claim
significantly reduced false-claim-congruent reasoning
and false-claim belief in a delayed test. Under cognitive
load at encoding, a mere correction was unable to re-
duce misinformed reasoning and beliefs relative to no-
exposure control, but also did no harm. In sum, Experi-
ment 3 found no evidence of familiarity backfire and is
thus more in line with the findings of Ecker et al. (2020)
than the findings of Skurnik et al. (2007). The fact that
cognitive load at fact-check encoding reduced the im-
pact of a correction on false-claim inference scores but
did not influence the effects of affirmations can be seen
as additional evidence that avoiding false-claim-
congruent reasoning relies on recollection of the
Fig. 13 Mean false-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure) and FCOl± (fact-check-only, with/without cognitive load) in
Experiment 3. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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correction, which would have been impaired by the cog-
nitive load (however, no such effect was observed for
false-claim belief ratings). Moreover, mere affirmations
were generally found to increase true-claim-congruent
reasoning and true-claim belief after a delay irrespective
of load at encoding, in line with Ecker et al. (2020) and
Experiments 1 and 2.
Bayesian analyses
To further corroborate the evidence for or against famil-
iarity backfire effects, we employed supplementary
Bayesian analyses; these have the advantage that evi-
dence in support of a null hypothesis can be quantified
(e.g., see Wagenmakers et al., 2018). Specifically, Bayes-
ian ANOVAs were run on inference scores and belief
Fig. 14 Mean true-claim inference scores across conditions NE (no-exposure) and FCOl± (fact-check-only, with/without cognitive load) in
Experiment 3. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
Fig. 15 Mean true-claim belief ratings across conditions NE (no-exposure) and FCOl± (fact-check-only, with/without cognitive load) in Experiment
3. Error bars show standard errors of the mean
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ratings from the no-exposure and fact-check-only condi-
tions of Experiments 1–3 (separately and conjointly; the
analysis on Experiment 3 data and the conjoint analysis
were pre-registered before running Experiment 3). These
tested whether there was evidence for a model including
a condition factor over a null model. Mean inference
scores across experiments were M = 5.06 (SE = .05) for
the no-exposure condition and M = 5.01 (SE = .06) for
the fact-check only condition (or M = 5.12 (SE = .06)
when using the load condition of Experiment 3). Mean
belief ratings across experiments were M = 4.40 (SE =
.08) for the no-exposure condition and M = 4.10 (SE =
.09) for the fact-check only condition (or M = 4.15 (SE =
.08) when using the load condition of Experiment 3).
The Bayes factors (BF10) in Table 4 quantify the evi-
dence for or against inclusion of the condition factor. A
BF10 > 1 suggests evidence in favor of including a condi-
tion factor (which can be interpreted as a main effect of
condition); a BF10 < 1 suggests evidence in favor of the
null model. For example, BF10 = 10 would suggest that
the data are 10 times more likely to have occurred under
the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis;
BF10 = 0.10 would suggest that the data are 10 times
more likely to occur under the null hypothesis. BF values
between 0.33 and 3 are taken to only provide anecdotal
evidence; BF values between 0.1 and 0.33, or 3 and 10
constitute moderate/substantial evidence; BF values < 0.1
or > 10 provide strong to very strong evidence (Jeffreys,
1961; Wagenmakers, Love, et al., 2018).
As can be seen in Table 4, the evidence for a famil-
iarity backfire effect from the inference scores in Ex-
periment 1 was only anecdotal, while Experiment 2
provided substantial evidence against a familiarity
backfire effect, and Experiment 3 yielded strong evi-
dence for a corrective effect in the no-load condition
(which matched the conditions of Experiments 1 and
2), while providing substantial evidence against famil-
iarity backfire in the load condition. Likewise, the sec-
ondary belief measures suggested substantial evidence
against backfire in Experiment 1 and substantial evi-
dence for a corrective effect in the no-load condition
of Experiment 3. However, the main conclusion to be
drawn, from the conjoint analyses, is that the experi-
ments reported in this paper overall yielded substan-
tial to strong evidence against familiarity backfire
effects: across experiments, while the secondary
belief-rating data remained inconclusive, the primary
inferential reasoning data were found to be approxi-
mately nine times more likely to have occurred under
the null hypothesis.
General discussion
The main focus of this paper was to investigate whether
mere exposure to a correction could familiarize people
with a novel piece of misinformation such that it would
negatively affect their reasoning and beliefs. In other
words, we tested whether corrections of novel misinfor-
mation could elicit a familiarity-driven backfire effect,
which may ironically strengthen misconceptions and
spread misinformation to new audiences (Schwarz et al.,
2007, 2016).3 Experiment 1 found some evidence for a
familiarity backfire effect, but the evidence was statisti-
cally weak and the result failed to occur in an exact rep-
lication with greater experimental power (Experiment 2)
as well as a close replication that added only a trivial
secondary task (the no-load condition of Experiment 3).
In fact, both Experiments 2 and 3 yielded substantial evi-
dence against the presence of a familiarity backfire ef-
fect, even under conditions that should maximize
reliance on familiarity and thus facilitate occurrence of
familiarity backfire, viz. the combination of novel claims
that maximized the familiarity boost conveyed by first
Table 4 Results from Bayesian analyses across Experiments 1–3
dV Effect direction BF10
Experiment 1
FIS NE < FCO (familiarity backfire) 2.801
FBR NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.154a
Experiment 2
FISd NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.135a
FBRd NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.363
Experiment 3
FISl- NE > FCO (corrective effect) 11.757b
FBRl- NE > FCO (corrective effect) 3.065a
FISl+ NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.135a
FBRl+ NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.774
Experiments 1–3
FIS(l-) NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.104a
FBR(l-) NE > FCO (corrective effect) 1.799
FIS(l+) NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.112a
FBR(l+) NE = FCO (no familiarity backfire) 0.760
Note. FIS and FBR: false-claim inference scores and belief ratings from the
delayed test. As test delay was manipulated in Experiment 2, only the delayed-
test variables (FISd and FBRd) were entered into analysis. No-load (FISl-; FBRl-)
and load (FISl+; FBRl+) conditions of Experiment 3 were included in separate
analysis of Experiment 3, and also in separate conjoint analyses. The condition
factor includes only conditions NE (no-exposure) and FCO (fact-check-only).
aindicates substantial and bindicates strong evidence for or against the null
3We note that Kessler, Braasch, and Kardash (2019) recently reported
a backfire effect with vaccination misinformation, which they observed
only in people with high “flexible thinking” scores. Kessler et al.
speculated that in flexible thinkers—those who open-mindedly con-
sider new information—corrections might thus spread novel misinfor-
mation. However, they did not measure misinformation novelty, and
only prior vaccination beliefs and not prior vaccination knowledge pre-
dicted the backfire effects that they observed; it therefore seems more
likely that these effects were driven by worldview rather than familiar-
ity (see Ecker & Ang, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2012).
Ecker et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications            (2020) 5:41 Page 20 of 25
exposure, a relatively long 1-week retention interval, and
correction encoding under cognitive load (the load con-
dition of Experiment 3). Thus, while there was some
variability across experiments, the overall evidence was
in support of the null hypothesis. This meshes well with
previous studies failing to find evidence for familiarity
backfire with more familiar claims (Ecker et al., 2017,
2020; Swire et al., 2017).
However, this does not rule out misinformation fa-
miliarity as an important driver of continued influ-
ence effects. This is because we also found consistent
evidence that after a delay of 1 week, affirmations of
true claims were more effective than corrections of
false claims. This closely mirrors the pattern observed
by Swire et al. (2017)4 and thus corroborates their
conclusion that misinformation familiarity can be a
counterproductive force when correcting false claims.
That is, the overall evidence observed here suggests,
in line with Swire et al., that acceptance of false
claims can be driven by claim familiarity, in particular
when the ability to recollect the correction is reduced
(e.g., due to delay-related forgetting or cognitive load).
This can offset the correction entirely, such that en-
dorsement of a false claim and false-claim-congruent
reasoning can return to baseline after a 1-week delay,
which essentially means that even a correction that is
reasonably effective in the short term can lose its im-
pact within a week, relative to a no-exposure control
condition (as demonstrated in Experiment 2; see
Figs. 7 and 8; note that corrections were still some-
what effective relative to the claim-only condition).
However, the boost to claim familiarity through claim
repetition within the correction is typically not sub-
stantial enough to cause actual backfire. Broadly
speaking, these results support the view that memory-
based evaluation processes determine inferential rea-
soning and endorsement of claims much more than
metacognitive judgments of fluency (cf. Schwarz
et al., 2007). The conflicting results from Experiment
1 can only serve as a reminder that one should never
place too much emphasis on the findings of a single
experiment (e.g., see Murayama, Pekrun, & Fiedler,
2014), and that significant p values can translate to
only “anecdotal” evidence under a Bayesian framework
(see Wagenmakers et al., 2018, for a detailed discus-
sion). We speculate that some of the variability in
findings arose due to the use of novel claims. While
it was necessary for the present project to use novel
claims for the theoretical and practical reasons out-
lined earlier, the claims we used are not generally
representative of claims encountered in the real
world, which are typically grounded in contextual
world knowledge. Ratings of such novel claims may
be inherently less reliable than ratings of familiar
claims that can tap into pre-existing knowledge and
beliefs (Swire-Thompson, DeGutis, & Lazer, 2020).
Additional evidence obtained in the present set of
experiments regards the illusory truth effects con-
veyed by mere exposure (Begg et al., 1992; Dechêne
et al., 2010; Parks & Toth, 2006; Unkelbach, 2007;
Weaver et al., 2007). While some research has found
that even a single exposure to a false claim can have
measurable impact on claim endorsement (e.g., Pen-
nycook et al., 2018), the evidence here was somewhat
mixed. Experiment 1 found some evidence for illusory
truth effects with true but not false claims, whereas
Experiment 2 found evidence for illusory truth effects
after a delay with false claims (and also on true-claim
belief ratings but not inference scores). This pattern
was observed despite the fact that participants could
not reliably differentiate between true and false
claims, and control-group (no-exposure) belief ratings
were generally lower for true claims in both experi-
ments. The fact that illusory truth effects were only
observed in the delayed test of Experiment 2 but not
in the immediate test suggests that these effects were
indeed driven by familiarity rather than perceived so-
cial consensus (see Pennycook et al., 2018; Unkelbach,
2007; Weaver et al., 2007). However, apart from that,
we can only conclude from these results that a single
exposure to a claim can lead to enhanced subsequent
endorsement, but that this is not always the case.
Thus, to some extent, this mirrors our conclusions
regarding the role of familiarity for continued influ-
ence, in that the evidence regarding the illusory truth
effects that we obtained is somewhat inconsistent, but
generally suggests that familiarity likely impacts rea-
soning and endorsement of claims (we also note that
evidence for illusory truth effects in general is much
more solid than the evidence for familiarity backfire
effects; e.g., see De keersmaecker et al., 2020).
The practical implications of this research are clear:
recommendations to front-line educators and communi-
cators to entirely avoid repeating misinformation when
debunking (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2011; Lewandowsky
et al., 2012; Peter & Koch, 2016; Schwarz et al., 2007,
2016) were unwarranted. Recent research indicates that
repeating misinformation when correcting it can have a
positive effect, enhancing a correction in the short term
(presumably by increasing the salience of the correction
and facilitating conflict resolution and knowledge revi-
sion processes; see Ecker et al., 2017; Kendeou et al.,
2014). There is also evidence that exposure to a correc-
tion that repeats a piece of (non-novel) misinformation
4Peter and Koch (2016) also observed this asymmetry, although they
referred to this asymmetry itself as a familiarity backfire effect, which,
in our view, is a misnomer.
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does not lead to backfire effects relative to either a pre-
correction or no-exposure baseline (Ecker et al., 2020).
Finally, the present study suggests that exposure to a
correction does not cause familiarity backfire relative to
a no-exposure control even with novel claims, and thus
corrections do not seem to spread misinformation to
new audiences easily.
That being said, recommendations to avoid unneces-
sary misinformation repetition should arguably remain
in place—while one repetition in the context of a cor-
rection may have benefits for correction salience, add-
itional repetition of the misinformation runs the risk
of enhancing familiarity without any added benefit.
Moreover, while we have demonstrated that correc-
tions do not backfire when it comes to specific beliefs
about a proposition, one needs to differentiate this
from the over-arching framing that is achieved by
stating something that is false (see Lakoff, 2010). For
example, a government official stating that there are
“no plans for a carbon tax” may achieve a reduction
in the specific belief that a carbon tax rollout is being
prepared, but at the same time using the word “tax”
may make people who oppose new taxes for ideo-
logical or pragmatic reasons think about climate
change as a threat rather than an opportunity (also
see Fletcher, 2009; Kahan, 2010; Lewandowsky et al.,
2017). Therefore, communicators should perhaps
focus their considerations more on the framing of
their corrections, as repeating the misinformation
frame might do more damage than repetition of the
misinformation itself. Investigating the effects of
frame repetition within corrections is, therefore, an
important target for future research.
Appendix
Claim pilot rating
A total of 100 MTurk participants partook in the online
pilot survey; participants could not participate in the main
study. Data from participants were excluded for the fol-
lowing two a-priori reasons: (1) uniform responding and
(2) completing the survey in less than 5 min. Two partici-
pants were classified as uniform responders; across all re-
sponses, they showed SD < 0.467, the lower outlier
criterion of the inter-quartile rule with a 2.2 multiplier.
Eight participants completed the survey in less than 5
min. One participant met both criteria. Consequently, n =
9 participants were excluded, resulting in a final sample
size of N = 91 (age range 20–64 years; Mage = 36.48;
SDage = 10.30; 50 male, 40 female, and 1 participant of un-
disclosed gender). Claim ratings from the pilot study are
presented in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix.
Table 5 Familiarity and believability ratings of false claims in
pilot study
Claim Familiarity Believability
M SD M SD
aFacebook is about to launch a “no swearing”
campaign
1.52 0.95 2.69 1.07
Frequently wearing silk garments in direct
contact with the skin can cause spontaneous
lactation
1.53 0.96 3.65 0.98
a50,000 men were raped in South Africa
last year
1.56 1.04 3.66 0.92
NASA is predicting six consecutive days of
darkness in the Northern hemisphere in 2022
due to a rare astronomical event
1.57 1.07 3.25 1.06
aThe ratio of male:female CEOs in Manchester,
UK is 1:1
1.60 0.94 3.59 1.03
aThe outer skin of a pineapple emits a
dangerous toxin into the environment when it
breaks down
1.60 1.02 2.19 1.19
The Cinderella Castle at Disneyland Florida can
be disassembled during hurricanes
1.64 1.04 3.24 1.11
Fibers found in cow skin are now being added
to Botox injections
1.76 1.09 2.85 1.00
“Camo” the German shepherd is the only dog
in history to become an Officer of the British
Empire
1.76 1.07 2.52 1.06
aHugh Hefner donated a fifth of his will to the
Planned Parenthood charity
1.84 1.08 2.47 0.99
aPlacing a car battery on a cement floor can
drain it and lead to its decay
1.90 1.28 2.74 1.39
The first artificial intelligence robot has been
appointed as a teaching assistant in Japan
2.00 1.11 2.21 0.97
Nike footwear has to meet a quota of
containing at least 20% recycled materials
2.10 1.17 3.41 1.32
The motor-vehicle accident rate regularly
surges after the Super Bowl in the home state
of the losing team
2.15 1.26 3.15 1.06
Bitcoin is used by the American Government
as a way to keep track of online criminal
activity
2.18 1.41 3.03 0.99
Wireless signals have a direct negative impact
on plant growth
2.22 1.28 2.15 1.20
The “redhead gene” is becoming extinct 2.42 1.45 3.60 1.02
Drinking cold water can be bad for your health 2.43 1.48 3.81 1.32
Antibacterial mouthwash helps cure colds and
sore throats
2.47 1.41 2.75 1.21
An at-home administration kit to screen for
type-1 diabetes is currently being introduced
2.48 1.33 2.52 1.09
Hospitals are busier on full moons 3.10 1.62 2.93 1.36
St Bernard dogs once carried brandy barrels
around their necks while rescuing people lost
in the mountains
3.43 1.63 2.29 1.01
If you pluck a gray hair, more gray hairs will
arrive in its place
3.53 1.54 2.27 0.91
Turkey meat makes you sleepy 3.97 1.58 3.22 0.98
Note. aindicates claims used in Experiments 1–3
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Inferential-reasoning questions (R = reverse-coded)
False claims
1. Facebook does not care about the language used on
its platform (R)
2. Facebook is investing money into promoting
inoffensive language on its platform
3. Men in South Africa generally do not need to be
concerned about sexual assault (R)
4. The rising number of reported HIV cases in South
Africa is partially due to a large number of male
rape cases
5. Industries concerned about gender equity can look
to Manchester, UK for solutions
6. In Manchester’s corporate environment, males are
much more likely than females to be promoted to
senior managerial positions (R)
7. There should be an awareness campaign to educate
consumers about the environmental risks associated
with pineapple skin
8. There is no need to worry about how to dispose of
pineapple skin (R)
9. Hugh Hefner was bankrupt when he died (R)
10. The late Hugh Hefner was a philanthropist,
supporting various charities
11. Concrete has no impact on electronics (R)
12. When taking out the battery of your car, it is
important not to place it on a concrete floor
True claims
1. Canada is lax regarding security on commercial
flights
2. In Canada, suspected terrorists are given an
immediate ban on flying (R)
3. A farmer can look at a chicken and predict the
color of the egg (white or brown) it will lay
4. Whether a chicken’s egg is white or brown is
completely random (R)
Table 6 Familiarity and believability ratings of true claims in pilot study
Claim Familiarity Believability
M SD M SD
aA man in Canada was still allowed to board his flight after a pipe bomb was found in his bag 1.40 0.87 2.29 1.09
In Turkey, people do not chew gum at night due to a superstition that it represents chewing the flesh of the dead 1.40 0.87 2.62 1.03
aThe color of a chicken’s egg is related to the chicken’s earlobe color 1.51 0.97 2.59 1.03
Hippopotamus milk is pink (item excluded as actually found to be false) 1.54 1.08 2.33 0.87
aChicken carcasses can be used for renewable energy 1.57 1.12 3.38 1.01
2014 was the deadliest year for flying on a plane, with 992 fatalities globally 1.62 0.96 3.27 1.10
aThe national animal of Scotland is the unicorn 1.68 1.23 2.78 1.08
aSaudi Arabia has revealed plans for a US$500 billion “no fossil fuels” mega-city 1.69 1.08 1.98 0.94
Exposure to microwaves can open the blood-brain barrier 1.81 1.10 2.84 1.23
In 2015, Sweden imported nearly 1.3 million tons of waste from Norway, the UK, Ireland, and others 1.84 1.19 2.47 1.28
aPessimism may be inherited due to a genetic mutation 1.93 1.17 2.20 1.01
Dandelion root extract is being tested as a cancer treatment 2.13 1.31 3.43 1.03
After the release of “The Hunger Games” in 2012, women’s participation in archery rose by 105% 2.20 1.37 2.74 1.03
Germany has officially removed any tuition fees for both local and international college students 2.25 1.34 3.57 0.90
Honeybee stings are used in the treatment of arthritis 2.29 1.49 2.75 1.22
The plague is still active in the US today 2.30 1.49 3.00 0.95
26 civilians died in the conflict along the Ukraine-Russia border in the summer of 2017 alone 2.35 1.31 2.78 1.05
The heart of a blue whale is so massive that a human being can swim through its arteries 2.49 1.58 2.97 1.22
Coca Cola single-bottle production is over 110 billion per year 2.52 1.34 3.63 1.37
A mattress doubles its weight after 10 years of usage 2.57 1.56 3.52 1.21
Roughly 800 journalists have been killed globally over the last 10 years 2.59 1.51 2.22 1.23
Nano-robots are being tested in the treatment of cancer 2.78 1.45 3.20 1.32
Acne is a hereditary condition 2.79 1.31 2.75 1.17
China is implementing a citizen ranking system to determine who is a good citizen 3.47 1.71 2.21 1.29
Note. aindicates claims used in Experiments 1–3
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5. The only profitable use of chickens lies in meat and
egg production (R)
6. In the future, it is likely that some of our energy
will come from bio-matter such as animal remains
7. Souvenir shops in Scotland are likely to stock
unicorn figures
8. Scotland’s national animal can be found in most
zoos (R)
9. Saudi Arabia is investing billions of dollars into
environmental sustainability
10. Investment in renewable energy technology in Saudi
Arabia is virtually non-existent (R)
11. In the future, genetic testing will be able to tell you
if your baby will grow into a pessimistic person
12. Whether people become pessimistic depends
entirely on their life experiences (R)
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